


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ANALYSIS OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING IN CAMBODIA



by

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Commander, USN

A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"The Disaster That Never Happened!", "U.N.'s Greatest Success!", "Model For The New Peacekeeping!"; these could all be headlines that describe the United Nations (U.N.) effort in Cambodia. To many in the world, this was the most important Peacekeeping mission the U.N. has ever attempted. It is the only success the U.N. has had in recent large-scale operations.

To the U.S. theater Commander-in-Chief (CINC) this is an important model of how the U.N. plans to accomplish future missions. Through an analysis of this model the U.S. can better support and participate in future missions. It also serves U.S. regional interests by supporting peaceful, prosperous, and stable governments in the region. The lessons-learned from Cambodia are being applied to the U.N. mission in Bosnia-Herzegovia and operations around the world. The head of the Cambodian mission, Yasushi Akashi, is now the head of the U.N. mission in Bosnia-Herzegovia. Many of the U.N. staff in Cambodia have been promoted to other missions throughout the world.

In the post-cold war international system the United States is being forced to react to the "do something" demands to stop the killing and suffering of a half dozen conflicts around the world. As the world's only remaining superpower, the U.S. is under great pressure from the media, allies, and the

international community to react. U.S. military forces are undergoing a significant reduction in size and budget. The U.S. cannot nor will not act alone in these conflicts. Multinational coalitions acting through the U.N. have become the vehicle of choice for military conflict resolution. These coalitions are envisioned to perform the full range of military and humanitarian operations. As General Powell concluded, "Peacekeeping and humanitarian operations are a given."¹

PURPOSE. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was, at the time, the largest and most expensive peacekeeping operation attempted by the United Nations². UNTAC attempted to bring peace to a nation that has suffered the loss of millions to civil war and internal strife. The peacekeeping operation represented a number of firsts in both the number of contributors and the diversity of the military components assigned to UNTAC. Thirty-four nations participated with representatives from every continent, major religious group and major world power.³

UNTAC for the most part has been hailed a success as a peacekeeping operation. UNTAC monitored a ceasefire, repatriated refugees, organized and ran an election, and overcame the support and supply problems of the largest peacekeeping operation undertaken by the United Nations up to that point. All this was accomplished in spite of the constant defiance and violence from the Khmer Rouge. This is why it is important to study this ground-breaking mission.

OBJECTIVES. This report will attempt to analyze the mission development and lessons learned from this peacekeeping operation. The examination of these will be helpful in planning and supporting future peacekeeping operations and anticipating problems areas in large complex U.N. missions. UNTAC is unique in the lack of U.S. units or large scale participation in the mission. U.S. participation consisted of a maximum of 47 United Nations Military Observers (UNMO) out of a military contingent of over 16,000 military personnel. This is an opportunity to study one of the most important U.N. peacekeeping missions undertaken that had little U.S. military influence. The study contains six chapters examining the topics listed below:

- Introduction
- A background on Cambodia
- Overview of UNTAC
- "Muscular Peacekeeping"
- Seven P's of Peacekeeping
- Conclusions

FORMAT. This report will briefly outline the chronology of events that led to U.N. involvement and trace the lessons learned from a U.N. Force Commander's point-of-view. It will closely examine how UNTAC was developed and the problems encountered through mission termination. Finally, it will summarize the lessons-learned through the "Seven P's of Peacekeeping" and present a conclusion.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND

The following historical background is summarized from the U.S. State Department's, Cambodia: background notes. The land occupied by Cambodia has been populated for over 2000 years. Although Cambodia had a rich and powerful past under the Hindu state of Funan and the Kingdom of Angkor, the modern history is marked by dominance and violence. On the verge of dissolution in the mid-19th century, the country requested French assistance. France established a protectorate in 1863, and by 1864, Cambodia was a virtual colony. France controlled the colony until 1945, when the Japanese dissolved the colonial administration, and King Norodom Sihanouk declared an independent, anti-colonial government. The government was deposed by the Allies in October 1945.

Although France regained Cambodia, the drive for independence was finally achieved at the 1954 Geneva conference to settle the French Indochina war. Cambodia maintained a neutral and independent foreign policy during the 1950s and 1960s. By the mid-1960s, parts of eastern Cambodian were being used as bases for the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong. In 1969, the United States began a series of air raids against these bases in Cambodia.

During this period, domestic politics polarized. Paris-educated leftists such as Son Sen, Ieng Sary, and Saloth Sar (later known as Pol Pot), led an insurgency under the clandestine

Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK). These insurgents were called the Khmer Rouge, literally the "Red Khmer." In 1970, the Cambodian monarchy was abolished, Prince Sihanouk joined the insurgents, power was given to Prime Minister Lon Nol, and the country was renamed the Khmer Republic.

The insurgency, supplied by the North Vietnam, continued to grow. The Khmer Rouge became stronger and more independent of Vietnam. At the start of 1975, the Khmer Rouge launched a large-scale offensive which ended in the destruction of Khmer Republic on April 17.

The Khmer Rouge soon turned Cambodia, renamed Democratic Kampuchea, into a land of horror. Estimates of the dead from executions, starvation, and disease range from 1 to 3 million out of a estimated 1975 population of 7.3 million. The relations with Viet Nam worsened rapidly as a result of border clashes, ideological differences, and anti-Vietnamese hatred. In December 1978, Viet Nam launched a full invasion of Cambodia and routed the Khmer Rouge, forcing the remnants into Thailand.

A new government was installed by the Vietnamese in January 1979. The government was headed by former Khmer Rouge who had fled the Pol Pot purges. The government was eventually called the State of Cambodia (SOC) and the governing regime called the Cambodian People's party (CPP). Viet Nam's occupation army controlled most of the country from 1979 to September 1989. During this period significant resistance groups emerged. Three major groups opposed the Vietnam-backed regime from bases along

the Thailand-Cambodian border. The Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK), known as the Khmer Rouge was the strongest with active support from China. Two other noncommunist groups formed a loose alliance with the Khmer Rouge to coordinate the fighting against the Vietnamese occupation. The two noncommunist groups were the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF). The former was the party of Prince Sihanouk and the latter was largely made up of followers of the former Lon Nol government. The United States provided support to the two noncommunist groups (FUNCINPEC and KPNLF) until at least 1990.

The four Cambodian factions, with external sponsorship fought throughout the 1980s. The end of the cold war removed outside financial support and political backing. Pressure was put on each of the four factions to end the fighting and reach a political settlement.

CHAPTER III

OVERVIEW OF UNTAC

According to the peace agreement, Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict, the United Nations first considered the situation in Cambodia in 1979. Later that year, the General Assembly adopted a resolution to monitor the situation and initiate efforts to find a peaceful solution to the problem. In July 1981, the International

Conference on Kampuchea was convened in New York. The Secretary General renewed his offer to find a peaceful solution to the Cambodian problem. He requested contacts be established with the principle countries concerned in order to assess their positions on the Cambodian problem.

The Secretary General, in 1985, was able to identify a number of objectives as starting points for negotiations. His efforts over the next three years centered on refining these objectives. In December 1987, Prince Norodom Sihanoch and Mr. Hun Sen (Prime Minister of SOC) initiated a dialogue in France. Following these talks, the Secretary General put forward the objectives identified in 1985. He proposed the integration of the various objectives for the final goal of a independent, neutral, and non-aligned Cambodian state. In particular, the framework provided for:

- Ceasefire and withdrawal of all foreign forces.
- Demobilization of all Cambodian forces.
- Self-determination through free and impartial elections, and the formation of a national reconciliation administration pending those elections.
- Repatriation and reintegration of refugees and displaced persons.
- Implementation of measures for economic growth and human rights education.

Following this proposal, the process gained momentum and the first face-to-face talks between all four Cambodian parties were

held in July 1988, in Jakarta, Indonesia.⁴

At the initiation of France, the Paris Peace Conference was held 30 August - 30 September 1989. Eighteen countries and the four Cambodian parties attended the Conference. The French and Indonesian Foreign Ministers acted as co-Presidents of the Conference. Among the countries attending the Conference were the five permanent members of the Security Council: China, France, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and the United States. Their presence marked a shared interest in a negotiated settlement. In 1990, the Five held a series of high-level meetings that represented an unprecedented and highly-visible effort to develop the basis of a general agreement.

On 28 August 1990, the Five announced an agreement had been reached on a framework for a political settlement of the Cambodian conflict. In a joint statement the four Cambodian parties agreed to accept the agreement. The statement also stipulated the creation of a Supreme National Council (SNC) as the legitimate source of authority in Cambodia throughout the transitional period. On 20 September 1990, resolution 668 endorsed the framework developed by the Five.⁵

The Secretary General, on 30 September 1991, recommended the establishment of the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) to assist in the maintenance of the ceasefire, liaison during the period preceding UNTAC, and to establish a mine awareness program. The Council approved this measure by resolution 717 (1991) and approved the establishment of UNAMIC

immediately after the signing of the settlement agreements.⁶

At the final meeting, on 23 October 1991, the Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict were signed. The Security Council fully supported these Agreements by adoption of resolution 718 (1991).⁷

Following the Peace Agreement, the mandate that was planned for UNTAC included complex military, political, and humanitarian taskings that entailed dismantlement of 70 percent of the factions military forces, while controlling the other 30 percent. UNTAC was further tasked with the security, supervision, and administration of a "free and fair" election. And finally, the repatriation of 350,000 Cambodians in Thai refugee camps. The most important task for UNTAC would be the Cambodian election scheduled for May, 1993.⁸

The Security Council gave the Secretary General direct responsibility for UNTAC, but command was given to a senior civilian U.N. career staff officer, Yasushi Akashi, who was designated Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG).⁹

UNTAC was organized into seven components, six civilian and a military component. The seven components are as follows: Human Rights, Civil Administration, Civil Police, Repatriation, Rehabilitation, Electoral, and Military.¹⁰

The Components tasks could essentially be reduced to two: create the conditions for a "free and fair" election by disarming the four factions, and conduct the elections during the period

specified by the Peace treaty. UNTAC failed to disarm the factions, but succeeded in holding a very successful election.¹¹

The failure to disarm the factions precipitated the major crisis of UNTAC. The Khmer Rouge refused to demobilize or permit the U.N. to enter areas they controlled.¹² A debate ensued over whether the UN military should abandon its peacekeeping mandate (Chapter VI) or use force (peace-enforcement, Chapter VII) to implement the provisions of the peace agreement.

The Secretary General recommended UNTAC continue with the elections and not enforce the disarming. The Security Council concurred and the Military Component changed their mandate.¹³

The Elections were held in May 1993, and proved successful beyond all expectations. The involvement in the election process was the key to the success of UNTAC.

CHAPTER IV

"MUSCULAR PEACEKEEPING"

Following the Peace agreement, UNTAC was conceived as peacekeeping under Chapter VI of the CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS. It is beneficial, at this point, to analyze how the UN authorizes missions and the difference between Chapter VI peacekeeping and Chapter VII peace-enforcement in the context of UNTAC. Article 33 of the Charter was used to authorize the mission in Cambodia. The Article is listed below to show that the use of military personnel is not specifically provided for in the Charter. However, a consensus has developed over time that

these operations have a basis in the broad powers conveyed to the Security Council and General Assembly by the Charter.

Article 33

1. The parties to any dispute , the continuance which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Chapter VI peacekeeping can be described as military operations where belligerents have agreed to a cease-fire and a lightly armed and/or unarmed military observers are inserted to maintain and observe the peace agreement. These forces are neutral and have the consent of all parties with self-defense as a last resort.

UNTAC was conceived as Chapter VI peacekeeping, but like many missions developed into something between Chapter VI peacekeeping and Chapter VII peace-enforcing. This has been described as "6 1/2"¹⁴ or "muscular" peacekeeping. Joint Pub 3-0 uses another definition termed "peace operations"¹⁵ to describe actions taken under authority of Chapter VI and those

Chapter VII operations not involving unrestricted use of combat power to fulfill a mandate.

When the Khmer Rouge refused to demobilize their forces and started to reengage the SOC forces, UNTAC was forced into a role between Chapter VI and VII. Consent of all parties was not necessary and neutrality was difficult to maintain. Force was authorized not only for self-defense, but enforcement of portions of the mandate.

Chapter VII of the UNITED NATIONS CHARTER authorizes action against any threat to peace through Article 42, which states:

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Chapter VII is associated with peace-enforcement. Peace-enforcement, as described by Joint Pub 3-0, is the coercive use or threat of military force to restore peace.¹⁶

When the Khmer Rouge rejected the peace agreement, UNTAC was compelled to use force and the threat of force to carry out the remaining items of the mandate. This moved the mission between Chapter VI peacekeeping and Chapter VII peace-enforcement.

Admiral Borda, head of the U.S. Navy, in a recent interview, talked about the difference between peacekeeping and peacemaking forces on the ground in Bosnia.¹⁷ According to U.N. and Joint definitions, peacemaking is primarily a diplomatic means to bring parties together. What Admiral Borda was actually talking about in Bosnia was peace-enforcement, not peacemaking. Even Admiral Borda's extensive knowledge of U.N. operations in Bosnia, use of the new "peace" terminology can be difficult.

CHAPTER V

SEVEN P's OF PEACEKEEPING

The lessons learned from UNTAC are developed from the Force Commander's perspective. The lessons are organized under seven areas that the UNTAC mission had success or difficulties with. All U.N. missions are different, but this list will assist a Force Commander or a supporting CINC in anticipating some problem areas. This list also doubles as a way to measure and compare how a mission is going. The lessons learned from UNTAC are summarized under the "Seven Ps of Peacekeeping":

- Purpose
- Planning
- Procurement
- Participation
- People
- Persistence
- Public Affairs

PURPOSE. The purpose of each mission must be defined by a clear, achievable, flexible, and politically feasible mandate. UNTAC suffered from a mandate that was written by diplomats and politicians with built-in ambiguities and gaps.

The UNTAC mandate authorized "oversight of human rights during the transitional period", and "the investigation of human rights complaints, and, where appropriate, corrective action."¹⁸

The authorization of the use of force was never clearly spelled out in the UNTAC mandate. In response to murders of FUNCINPEC officials and incidents of political intimidation, UNTAC eventually arrested suspects and established a U.N. Special Prosecutor's office, but the office was formed too late to be truly effective.

The Force Commander who must execute this mandate may find it unworkable. Each of the factions in Cambodia found ways to interpret the peace agreement to their advantage. The Khmer Rouge justified their refusal to honor the peace agreement by saying UNTAC had not insured the departure of "foreign forces" from Cambodia.¹⁹

When the Khmer Rouge refused to disarm and denied access to their territory, some members wanted UNTAC to force the Khmer Rouge to honor the peace agreement. UNTAC did not use force, but continued to negotiate with the Khmer Rouge even after attacks on UNTAC. Attacks against the Khmer Rouge would have changed the mandate, lost UNTAC its neutrality, and possibly turned former allies China and Thailand against UNTAC, jeopardizing the

elections.

UNTAC's non-aggressive open-door policy toward the Khmer Rouge maintained consensus and broad support for the mission.

Militarily, UNTAC could not have enforced the settlement without a change to the mandate that specified force (Chapter VII). Also, UNTAC did not have the military capacity to fight a guerrilla war against the Khmer Rouge (Viet Nam had tried for ten years).

When developing a mandate a couple of simple questions need to be asked. The first question should be, "what type of mission is this?". Is it:

peacekeeping	Chapter VI
peace operations	Chapter VI+
peace-enforcement	Chapter VII

What is the possibility of the mission escalating? The answer to these questions will determine the size, composition and capacity of the military force. Lt Gen John Sanderson, UNTAC Force Commander, stated to his staff, "Chapter VI with a multinational force is difficult, but Chapter VII would be impossible."

Next, the mandate must be specific and spell out what military is expected to do. Vague and broad terms must be defined. Taskings in the mandate should be prioritized to note what is critical. UNTAC failed to disarm the factions, but succeeded in overseeing the elections. A mandate should spell out what is critical in a mission.

Lastly, the mandate needs to address mission termination.

If the plan becomes unworkable, how does the U.N. quit? The U.N. must set the goals before they go in. Completion of these goals should be the criteria for success or failure and mission termination.

Future missions with ambitious mandates must be clear in the tasks of the mandate and the authority to accomplish those tasks.

PLANNING. Planning is perhaps the most critical aspect of a peacekeeping mission. The planning for UNTAC had mixed successes and failures. The planning at U.N. Headquarters could not keep up with the demands of UNTAC. The lack of detailed plans prior to deployment and the AD HOC planning in the field limited the initial effectiveness of UNTAC. Some of the UNTAC components had excellent plans, but suffered from "stovepipe planning," where each component developed its plan in isolation and did not coordinate with other components. The U.N.'s inability to gather basic information on the country seriously hampered initial plans. So as not to offend the factions, the U.N. did not form a contingency plan for UNTAC.

The U.N. planning staff in Cambodia and New York, admitted the U.N. had a limited planning capability for large-scale missions like UNTAC. The U.N. planning staff was overwhelmed trying to respond to the needs of UNTAC and 12 other peacekeeping missions at the same time. The U.N. planning system works well for the traditional, small-scale peacekeeping missions, but the demands for large-scale, complex, billion dollar missions

overtaxed the U.N. planning system capabilities.

In February 1992, UNTAC's implementation plan was approved and initial deployment occurred the next month. However, the plan did not provide enough detail to begin operations. The UNTAC staff in the field had to develop the plans AD HOC, causing considerable delays. The Military Component was due to disarm the factions' troops in Mid-June 1992 and complete the task in August 1992. Detailed operational orders were completed only one week prior to demobilization, jeopardizing the plan.*

"Stovepipe" planning by the UNTAC Components and little communication between them caused needless delay and confusion. The initial U.N. survey missions provided the opportunity for early coordination of mission activities. The various components failed to coordinate because each component formed and organized at different stages prior to the start of UNTAC. Some component heads had not been identified or planning staffs formed when other components were already entering the country.

The two main lessons here are timing and integration. The heads of major components and their planning staffs must be identified early and at roughly the same time to facilitate the initial planning. These staffs must integrate their planning from the beginning and throughout the mission.

The Military Component was tasked to provide security for the Civilian Components' activities in the country. The Civilian

* Information from author's discussions with UNTAC planning staff.

Components did not do any joint planning until the crisis of Khmer Rouge attacks forced them to form joint plans.

The U.N. does not have an intelligence arm to help in planning peacekeeping missions. It relies on U.N. survey missions and intelligence aid from member countries. When the initial units arrived, the road network had deteriorated to such an extent between the survey mission and initial deployment that plans had to be scrapped and others amended.**

Current intelligence would have been useful, but the member states did not always provide the requested information. The U.N. has no procedures for safeguarding sensitive information. Once it is given to the U.N. it is considered leaked. This has caused numerous problems and a formal procedure needs to be used to pass sensitive information to the U.N.

A political decision was made not to develop a contingency plan for UNTAC in case one of the factions violated the peace agreement. Since all parties agreed to the settlement, the UN felt it would be an act of bad faith to develop a contingency plan in case one of the parties violated the agreement. Contingency planning is essential to any military mission. The Security Council should require every U.N. mission to form a contingency plan so as not to offend the parties of that mission.

PROCUREMENT. Procurement for a U.N. mission like UNTAC starts

** Information received by author from UNTAC engineering officer.

when the mission is approved by the Security Council. Then the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Field Operations Division prepare an implementation plan, mission, budget, and deployment plan. This sometimes creates problems because the mission is approved before the budget is submitted. After a review the budget is sent to the General Assembly for approval. Once approved, the mission is paid for through the peacekeeping assessment of the member states. The U.S. peacekeeping assessment is 30.4 percent. The U.S. share of UNTAC's estimated \$1.7 billion cost is over \$500 million dollars.²⁰

The U.N. was not prepared for the logistic and procurement demands of a mission the size of UNTAC. The U.N. does not have large supply depots and is forced to purchase items for each mission from contract suppliers. Purchases of such large quantities of equipment and supplies could not keep pace with the mission. Small logistic staffs and procurement procedures developed for smaller missions caused the inevitable delays and inefficiencies.

At the in-country operational level, the U.N. Force Commander has no delegated financial authority. This is a problem for the military for they are at the mercy of the U.N. supply system. This supply system works reasonably well for the smaller missions, but in UNTAC it presented problems. During the initial military deployment to Cambodia, one of the first units to arrive could not operate its equipment because it had no fuel. Although UNTAC had received a \$200 million advance budget, the fuel

contract was tied to the release of further appropriation.

PARTICIPATION. UNTAC eventually had 34 nations participate in the mission. This insured a balance and neutrality by the Military Component. "Great and regional powers displayed an ability to act in a neutral way was made easier by their direct involvement"²¹.

The factions were directly influenced by the participation in UNTAC of former benefactors and allies. A general lesson from UNTAC is the more countries that participate in a mission the greater the chance for neutrality and influence over belligerents.

As an example, China and Thailand were able to exert an influence on the Khmer Rouge due to their close association during the ten years of war with the Vietnamese. By virtue of China and Thailand being members of UNTAC, the Khmer Rouge were less aggressive in their attacks on UNTAC.

Khmer Rouge propaganda attempted to attack the unity of UNTAC by identifying "good UNTAC and bad UNTAC". Military units from Indonesia, Bangladesh and Pakistan were termed "good UNTAC" on the basis of racial and socio-economic background. Attempts to draw units away from a common purpose failed because attacks on any in the Military Component was viewed as an attack on the international community.²²

PEOPLE. The UNTAC Force Commander set a strategy to form an

alliance between the people of Cambodia and UNTAC. When the first peacekeepers entered Khmer Rouge territory, the Cambodian people came out in droves to welcome them. At this point, Gen. Sanderson created the concept of "stealing the people" from the factions. UNTAC went directly to the people with civic action, humanitarian aid, electoral education and finally the elections. UNTAC and the Cambodian people formed an important bond that acted as a counter to factional influence and propaganda. This bond with the people significantly contributed to the success of UNTAC.

PERSISTENCE. A large complex peacekeeping mission like UNTAC requires a mission-wide "will-to-succeed". The civilian and military leaders of these missions must be chosen with great care. In a multinational complex mission like UNTAC, the leaders are looked to for the will and "persistence" to see the mission through.

When the Khmer Rouge violated the peace agreement, attacked UNTAC and tried to disrupt the peace process, the UNTAC leaders had to hold the peace process together. Under great pressure to aggressively respond to the Khmer Rouge, they instead, kept the door open to the Khmer Rouge, changed the mandate and took minor losses to secure a peace. This required courage and a dogged persistence in the face of external and internal pressures.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS. Public affairs had a major influence on UNTAC.

UNTAC developed a Khmer-speaking radio station that was able to counter the propaganda of the factions. Prior to the elections, small radios were distributed free throughout the country. This was very popular and very effective in educating the people on the elections.

Some problems did occur. Unauthorized statements, by U.N. officers, on U.N. or UNTAC policy were sometimes used by the media to fuel volatile situations. Orders had to be issued to curtail comments on U.N. policy, and direct all questions to the Public Affairs office.

It is important to use the media. They are the mission's voice to the world and the mission is working for a world organization.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

"The UN's most ambitious post-cold-war dream was to rebuild the shattered countries. The dream itself is not shattered, or not yet; it worked unexpectedly well in Cambodia,..."²³

Each peacekeeping mission is different, and UNTAC was unique in its size, cost and complexity. The world views UNTAC as a model for shattered countries. It was a success for completing the elections and establishing a legitimate government, yet it failed to disarm and demobilize the Khmer Rouge, who are still waging war against the new government. UNTAC was a success but it came very close to failing.

For the CINC and future Force Commanders, a common framework is needed for each mission as a tool for analysis. The Seven P's were used as that tool. They are a quick "checklist" to use when entering a mission, checking the current status and getting out. It can be applied to any U.N. mission and is especially useful in comparing UNTAC to missions in Bosnia and Somalia.

Analysis by this "checklist" reveals a number of important lessons from the UNTAC mission. For U.N. missions in the future, the mandate must be clear and doable. It must be clarified and goals set before deployment. The more complex the mission the more detailed the planning. Funds will always be a problem, make sure the support is there before troops are sent in. Leaders must be carefully chosen for their skill, flexibility and will. A grassroots approach to the people is critical to success. Finally, use the media.

NOTES

1. Colon L. Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 5, Winter 1992/93, p. 36.
2. "Deep concern expressed over implementation of Paris Agreements in Cambodia," UN Chronicle, December 1992, p. 31.
3. United Nations, Preliminary Study of Lessons Learnt by the Military Component. (Cambodia 1993), p. 1.
4. United Nations, Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict. (Paris, October 1991) p. i.
5. Ibid. p. v.
6. Ibid. p. viii.
7. Ibid.
8. Karl Farris, "UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: On Balance a Success," PARAMETERS, Spring 1994, p. 42.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid. p. 44.
12. "Urge full deployment of UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia," UN Chronicle, September 1992, p. 19.
13. Karl Farris, p. 45.
14. United Nations, The Blue Helmets, "2d ed." (United Nations 1990), p. 5.
15. U.S. Joint Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-Q, (Washington, 1993), p. GL-13.
16. Ibid.
17. "Borda's Fast Start," Navy Times, May 9, 1994, p. 14.
18. United Nations, Agreements. pp. 12-13.
19. Karl Farris, p. 47.

20. United Nations, "Urge full deployment...", p. 18.
21. United Nations, Preliminary Study, p.24.
22. Ibid.
23. "Shamed are the Peacekeepers," The Economist, 30 April 1994, p.15.

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